Bekiut Summary Daf Hey

Gemara: Continuation of topic on previous Daf about the disagreement between R’ Meir and the Rabbis about the reciprocal punishment of lashes for Eidim Zommemin. [R’ Yirmiyah provides a Pasuk that, according to R’ Meir, serves as a warning to Eidim Zommemin. Question: how do the Rabbis explain the use of this Pasuk (since they derive the warning from a Pasuk that R’ Meir uses for punishment of the witnesses)?] Answer: the Rabbis use this Pasuk for the idea of proclamation--that after Eidim Zommemin are executed, the court must proclaim that this should serve as a warning to other Eidim Zommemin. Question: from where does R’ Meir derive the idea of proclamation? Answer: He derives it from the second half of the Pasuk he uses as a source for the warning to Eidim Zommemin. First half serves as a warning, second half serves as a proclamation.

Mishnah: Eidim Zommemin divide the punishment in the case of a monetary punishment, but not in the case of a punishment of Malkus. Example—two Eidim testified that a person owes someone two hundred zuz. They are found to be Zommemin, and they split the punishment (the two hundred zuz) among themselves. But, if they testified about the person that he did something that receives a punishment of forty lashes, and they are found to be Zommemin, they do not divide the punishment and both get forty lashes.

Gemara: Question: What is the source for the rule that each Eid Zommem receives the full amount of lashes? Answer 1: Abaye: he word “Rasha” appears in the discussions of cases where the punishment is malkus and in a case where the punishment is execution. Just like in the case of execution, where the punishment is not divided (execution can’t be divided), so too in the case of malkus, the punishment is not divided. Answer 2: Rava:“Ka’asher Zammam” is not fulfilled if the Eidim Zommemin only get half of the lashes they intended to give. Question: then in the case of a monetary punishment we should make each Eid Zommem pay the full amount! Answer: when two people pay, the money joins together to form one reciprocal punishment. But with lashes, they do not join to form one punishment, because each set of lashes are not connected at all.

Mishnah: Eidim do not become Zommemin until they themselves are falsified. How so? If the Eidim say, we saw _____ kill _____, and other Eidim come and say we were with ______ or ______when you claimed that happenedàthey are not Zommemin. BUT, if the other Eidim come and say we were with YOU when you claimed that happenedàthey are Zommemin and they are executed.

If a third set of Eidim come and testify the same as the first set, and the second set falsifies them too, and if a fourth set comes and the second set falsifies them too, and if a hundred sets come and the same thing happens, they are all executed as Eidim Zommemin. R’ Yehudah says—this is a conspiracy, and only the first set of Eidim are executed.

Gemara: Question: What is the source for the rule that the Eidim Zommemin themselves must be falsified (vs. their testimony)? Answer1: Rav Adda: the Pasuk says “behold the witness is a false witness”—not false testimony. Shows that the ‘body’ of the witness must be falsified. Answer 2: Baraisa of the school of R’ Yishmael: the Pasuk says “to testify against him”—to remove the body of the witnesses from the scene.

Rava: Two Eidim testified that they saw _____ kill someone on the East Wing of a palace. Two more Eidim testified that those two Eidim were with them on the West Wing at the time. We must check—if you can see from the West Wing to the East Wing, then the first Eidim are not Zommemin. BUT, if you can’t see, then they are Zommemin. Attack: This is obvious! (That if you can see, then they aren’t Zommemin and if you can’t, then they are Zommemin.) Answer: You might have thought that even if you can’t see, we might take into consideration that they might have super strong eyesight. Rava comes to teach us that we don’t take it into consideration.

Rava: Two Eidim testified they saw _____ kill someone in Sura on Sunday morning. Two more Eidim testified that those two Eidim were with them in Nehardea on Sunday afternoon. We must check—if you can travel from Sura to Nehardea within the morning until the afternoon, then they are not Zommemin. BUT, if you can’t travel it, then they are Zommemin. Attack: This is obvious! Answer: You might have thought that even if you can’t travel it, we might take into consideration that they might have had super fast camels. Rava comes to teach us that we don’t take it into consideration.

Rava: Two Eidim testified that on Sunday, _____ killed someone. Two more Eidim testified that they were with them on Sunday, but on Monday, _____ killed someone. Even if they said that on Friday, ______ killed someone (so that ____ was already guilty by the time the first set testified), the first set are still executed as Eidim Zommemin. Reason: at the time the first set of Eidim testified, _____ was not liable to execution yet/didn’t have the status of one liable to execution yet. Question/Attack: What is Rava teaching us here? We already learned this in a Mishnah: If there are two groups of Eidim, and one is Zommemin,  the murderer is executed, and the Eidim Zommemin are executed. This already shows us a case where Eidim Zommemin are executed even though the accused is guilty! Answer: The second part of Rava’s statement is what he needs to teach something different than what that Mishnah teaches. The second part is a different case, where Eidim testify about a verdict. Two Eidim testified that on Sunday a verdict was made and ______ was sentenced to death. Two Eidim testified that they were with them on Sunday, but on Friday, ______ was sentenced to death. Even if they said on Monday, ______ was sentenced to death, (when ____ was not even sentenced to death yet by the time the first set testified), the first set are not executed. Reason: at the time the first set of Eidim testified, _____ was already sentenced to death/already had the status of one liable to execution. (This is the point that Rava is teaching—the change in status of the person that is accused is what matters in determining whether the Eidim Zommemin are executed or not.)

This can be said also with regard to monetary cases.  Two Eidim testified that on Sunday _____ stole cattle and slaughtered/sold it. Two more Eidim testified that they were with them on Sunday but on Monday, _____ stole cattle and slaughtered/sold it. Even if they said that on Friday, ______ stole cattle and slaughtered/sold it (so that ____ was already guilty by the time the first set testified), the first set pays the fine of the slaughtered/sold cattle. Reason: at the time the first set of Eidim testified, _____ was not liable to payment yet/didn’t have the status of one liable to payment yet. A different type of case: Two Eidim testified that on Sunday a verdict was made and ______ was sentenced to pay a fine for stealing cattle and slaughtering/selling it. Two Eidim testified that they were with them on Sunday, but on Friday, ______ was sentenced to pay the fine. Even if they said on Sunday, ______ stole cattle and slaughtered/sold it and was sentenced to pay on Monday, (when ____ was not even sentenced to pay yet by the time the first set testified), the first set do not pay the fine. Reason: at the time the first set of Eidim testified, _____ was already sentenced to payment/already had the status of one liable to payment yet.

**Amud Bet**

Quotation of Mishnah: “R’ Yehudah says—this is a conspiracy, and only the first set of Eidim are executed.” Question: If these sets of Eidim are considered to be plotting a conspiracy, then shouldn’t the first set of Eidim also not be executed? Answer: R’ Abahu: This is a case where the first set was already executed. Question: Then why is it mentioned that only the first set is executed if they were executed already? Answer: Rava: This is what R’ Yehudah means to say—if there is only one set that is Zommemin, then they are executed, but if there is more than one set that is Zommemin, this seems suspicious, and none of the sets are executed. Question: but R’ Yehudah says “only the first set of Eidim ALONE is executed”, implying that there is another set that is Zommemin that should be executed. Answer: this is a difficulty.

There was a woman who brought two Eidim to testify for her, but they were discredited because of contradictions during interrogation. She brought another set of Eidim, but they were discredited in the same way. She brought a third set of Eidim, and they were not discredited. Reish Lakish: This woman has been established as someone who brings false Eidim, so we do not accept the testimony of the third set. Attack: R’ Elazar: If she has been established as one who brings false Eidim, then the whole nation has been established as a nation that brings false Eidim! Another point: One time they were sitting before R’ Yochanan and this case came up. Reish Lakish said: this woman has been established to be disreputable. R’ Yochanan said to him: If she has been established to be disreputable, then the whole nation has been established to be disreputable! Reish Lakish said to R’ Elazar sternly: You heard R’ Yochanan say these words, and you did not quote them to me in his name!

Question: Can we say that Reish Lakish sides with R’ Yehudah in the Mishnah (both reject testimony based on a suspicious pattern) and R’ Yochanan sides with the Rabbis in the Mishnah (both accept testimony regardless of a suspicious pattern)? Rejection: Reish Lakish could say to you that he sides even with the Rabbis: in the Mishnah, no one is finding false Eidim—they just come on their own. So therefore he might say that he accepts that testimony, but not here, because it is more suspicious that someone is bringing the false Eidim. It would make sense that Reish Lakish rejects the testimony here, but maybe not in the case of the Mishnah. And R’ Yochanan could say to you that he sides even with R’ Yehudah: in this Mishnah, it seems very suspicious that the second set of Eidim (the ones that discredit all of the others) was with all of the other sets at the same time at the same place. So therefore, R’ Yochanan might not accept the testimony there, and side with R’ Yehudah. But here, it is not as suspicious because it is possible that the first two sets of Eidim did not know the testimony, while the third set did know the testimony. It would make sense that R’ Yochanan accepts the testimony here but maybe not in the case of the Mishnah.

Mishnah: Eidim Zommemin are not executed until the verdict against the accused has been handed down. The Sadducees: Eidim Zommemin are not executed unless the accused has been executed, as it says: “a life for a life”. The Chachamim: But it has already been stated “and you should do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, and brother implies that he is still alive! If this is the case (that they are executed only if the verdict has not been carried out), then why is it stated “a life for a life”? You might think that from the moment they are established as Eidim Zommemin they can be executed. Therefore, it is stated “a life for a life”, which shows us that the Eidim can only be executed once a verdict is decided. (“A life for a life” shows us that the accused needs to be dead or as if he is dead—has the status of a dead person. This occurs when the verdict has been decided, but before it is carried out.)

Gemara: A Baraisa taught: Beribi: If the Eidim Zommemin have not yet killed the accused when they are found to be Zommemin, they are executed. If they have already killed him when they are found to be Zommemin, then they are not executed. Question: Beribi’s father: Is it not a Kal Vachomer? If Eidim Zommemin are executed for just attempting to get someone killed, shouldn’t they also be executed if they did actually get someone killed! Answer: Beribi: You have taught us that we do not punish based on logic/Kal Vachomer. Even though it makes sense that the Eidim Zommemin are killed when they do get someone killed, we cannot accept that rule if it is based on a Kal Vachomer.

Another point: For we learned in a Baraisa: “If a man shall take his sister, the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother (…they shall be cut off in the sight of the members of their people).” We learn from the Pasuk that one receives Kares for an incestuous relationship with his sister, the daughter of his father, and his sister, the daughter of his mother, but from where do we learn that he will get Kares is he takes his sister, the daughter of both his father and his mother? The Torah states, at the end of that Pasuk, “he has uncovered the nakedness of his sister” (shows that rule applies to a full sister also). Question: Why is that last part of the Pasuk necessary? We can learn that one with his full sister will also get Kares from a Kal Vachomer—if his sister, the daughter of his father, and his sister, the daughter of his mother, are forbidden to him and he will get Kares, then for sure his sister, the daughter of his father and mother are forbidden to him and he will get Kares! Answer: The fact that we need the last part of the Pasuk teaches us that we can’t punish based on a Kal Vachomer.

Continuation of Baraisa: we learned that you can’t derive a punishment based on logic/Kal Vachomer, but how do we know that we can’t derive a prohibition based on logic/Kal Vachomer? The Torah states: “The nakedness of your sister, daughter of your father or daughter of your mother (born in the house or born outside the house, you shall not uncover their nakedness).” We learn from this Pasuk that it is prohibited for one to take his sister, the daughter of his father, and his sister, the daughter of his mother, but from where do we learn that it is prohibited for one to take his sister, the daughter of his father and mother? The Torah states, “the nakedness of the daughter of your father’s wife, born of your father, she is your sister, you shall not uncover her nakedness.” Question: Why is that extra prohibition necessary? We can learn that one is prohibited from taking his full sister from a Kal Vachomer—if his sister, the daughter of his father, and his sister, the daughter of his mother, are forbidden to him, then for sure his sister, the daughter of his father and mother are forbidden to him! Answer: The fact that we need the extra prohibition teaches us that we can’t prohibit based on a Kal Vachomer.

Question: From where do we know that this rule (that we only punish the Eidim Zommemin if they were found out after the verdict has been decided) applies also in a case of malkus? Answer: we learn it through a Gezeira Shava—the word “Rasha” appears in descriptions of cases involving both execution and malkus; this Gezeira Shava connects all the laws of Hazamah from execution cases to malkus cases. Question: From where do we know that this rule applies to a case of galut? Answer: we learn it through a Gezeira Shava—the word “Rotze’ach” appears in the description of both the murderer and the accidental killer. This Gezeirah Shava connects all the laws of Hazamah from execution cases to galut cases.

Baraisa: R’ Yehudah ben Tabbai: I must be comforted if I didn’t execute an Eid Zommem when only he is false and not his fellow Eid. This is to counter the opinion of the Sadducees, who say that Eidim Zommemin are not executed unless the accused has been executed. Shimon ben Shetach responds: I must be comforted if you spilled innocent blood—if you killed this Eid Zommem, because the Chachamim say, you do not execute an Eid Zommem or give him lashes until both the Eidim in this group are falsified. R’ Yehudah ben Tabbai took it upon himself to only make a ruling in front of Shimon ben Shetach, and he visited the grave of that Eid every single day of his life and his voice was heard by the people around him. They thought it was the voice of the Eid, but R’ Yehudah told them it was his voice, and that they will know because when he dies, the voice will stop. Rav Acha the son of Rava said to Rav Ashi: The voice could stop and still have been the Eid’s because maybe he was comforted by the death of the person that killed him, or maybe R’ Yehudah ben Tabbai appeased him and he is now silent.

Mishnah: “By the word of two Eidim or three Eidim shall the one who is to die be put to death.” If it is stated that the testimony upholds with two Eidim, why is it necessary to state that it is upheld with three Eidim? The purpose is to draw an analogy: just like three Eidim can falsify two Eidim, so too, two Eidim can falsify three Eidim. From where do we know that two Eidim can falsify even a hundred Eidim? The Torah states: “Eidim”. R’ Shimon: just like with two Eidim, you can only punish them if both of them are found to be Zommemin, so too with three Eidim, you can only punish them if all three are found to be Zommemin. From where do we know that with a hundred Eidim, you can only punish them if all of them are found to be Zommemin? The Torah states: “Eidim”.

R’ Akiva says: the mention of the third Eid is to teach us that we must act more stringently, not more leniently. We treat him the same as we treat the other two Eidim. And if this is how we treat an accomplice of transgressors—we punish him like the transgressors, how much more so will HaShem treat an accomplice of performers of a mitzvah and reward him like the performers of a mitzvah.

Just as with two Eidim, if one of the Eidim is disqualified, the testimony is invalidated, so too with three Eidim, if one of the Eidim is disqualified, the testimony is invalidated (even though it can still technically stand with three Eidim). From where do we know that with a hundred Eidim, if one of the Eidim is disqualified, the testimony is invalidated? The Torah states: “Eidim”. [Mishnah continues on next Daf].

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Question: This Daf discusses a situation in which witnesses testify falsely about someone who did actually commit the crime. Rava says that these witnesses are punished if they change the status of the accused to a Bar Ketala, one who is liable to execution; but if they do not change the status, and he is already a Bar Ketala by the time they testify, then they are not punished.

Why do we care so much about the change in status of an actual murderer? If he is a murderer, shouldn’t it not matter when he was established as one liable to execution?  Why are we so harsh on these witnesses when they testified about a real killer?

Gemara Bekiyot Daf Daled

Gemara summary: Daf Daled

Gemara: the Gemara continues the debate on the previous daf, about the laws of a mikveh and whether a mixture that falls into the mikveh is judged based on the color or the mixture’s majority.

Rava quotes a Mishnah, which states that if a kortov of wine fell into three lugin of drawn water less a kortov  (total three lugin of liquid in mixture), and the color of the mixture is that of the wine, and the mixture fell into a deficient mikveh, the mixture does not invalidate the mikveh and can be used to complete the needed forty se’ah measure of water to complete a mikveh. Similarly, if a kortov of milk fell into three lugin of drawn water less than a kortov, and the color of the mixture was colorless (like water), and the mixture fell into the mikveh, the mixture does not invalidate the mikveh (Tana Kammah). Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri says, everything depends on color (and therefore the colorless mixture with the milk, would indeed invalidate the mikveh because it is the color of water.)

The Gemara now addresses Rava’s explanation that Rav’s ruling is only consistent with Rav Yochanan ben Nuri. Rav Papa wondered if Rav had the reading of “less a kortov” in the Mishnah’s first case (with the wine), as cited in the version above? If so, then if there were three full lugin of drawn water (aside from the wine), the mixture would invalidate the mikveh according to the Tanna Kammah  (as he doesn’t consider color a factor). Whereas, R’ Yochanan would say that everything is based on color. Therefore, Rav who rules that wine colored mixture doesn’t disqualify the mikveh even if it has three full lugin of water, follows only R’ Yochanan. Or perhaps, Rav didn’t have the reading “less than a kortov” in the Mishnah’s case with the wine and therefore R’ Yochanan ben Nuri would only disagree with the Tanna Kammah in the Mishnah’s case about the milk. (Tannah Kammah says it would not invalidate the mikveh because mixture doesn’t have three full lugin of water, R’ Yochanan would say it would invalidate mikveh because the color is like water.) Accordingly, Rav is in accordance with both views.

Gemara responds and says that although this was a question to Rav Papa, to Rava it was clear that Rav was only consistent with R’ Yochanan ben Nuri. Abaye tells Rav Yosef, who didn’t hear of Rav Yehuda’s statement in the name of Rav, that he was taught the Mishnah to not include “less a kortov” and that Rav’s view was in accordance with both views.

Another ruling by Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav was about a barrel filled with water or wine that fell into the Great Sea and whether the person who immersed himself there was still tamei because of it. The same rule, that the person was still tamei, also was true if a loaf of terumah fell into the Great Sea, even though you would have thought that you would maintain the terumah in its previous status before it fell into the Sea.

Mishnah: Edim Zomemin testify falsely that a person owes his fellow two hundred zuz. According to Rav Meir, they receive malkus (lashes) for their false testimony and pay their victim the amount they intended him to lose, because these two punishments are derived from two different pesukim. The Chachamim, however, say that whoever pays does not receive malkus. The same applies respectively for the Chachamim and Rav Meir, in a case when the Edim Zomemin falsely testify that ploni is liable for forty lashes. According to Rav Meir, the Edim Zomemin each get 80 lashes, one set for violating “don’t bear false witness” and one for the pasuk “you should do to him as he planned…” The Chachamim say that they would only get 40 lashes each for their hazamah penalty, and not for false testimony.

Gemara: The Rabbi’s view makes sense because of the pasuk “In accordance with his wickedness” which teaches he is liable for one wickedness but not two. What is the reasoning for R’ Meir’s view?  Ulla says that R’ Meir’s view is derived from the law of one who slanders his wife; just as one who slanders his wife gets lashes and pays, so too anyone who does crime that would receive both lashes and monetary payment, receives both punishments. The Gemara then asks, how can this comparison be made if the one who defames his wife pays a fine, but Zomemin don’t get a fine, rather compensation. Because R’ Meir holds like R’ Akiva who says that Edim Zomemin’s witness if a fine.

There are those who taught Ulla’s statement differently to be referencing the laws of the korban pesach, and to make a comparison between the korban pesach and edim Zomemin as both being prohibitions that don’t involve actions and therefore don’t receive malkus. Therefore Ulla would say that just as one who defames his wife is doing a prohibition with no real action and yet receives lashes, so too one receives lashes for any prohibition that doesn’t involve an action.

The Gemara refutes this comparison again because one who defames his wife clearly has a prohibition of unusual severity.  Ultimately, although neither have the same nature of stringency as the other, the common characteristic between them is that they are both prohibitions with no action. This is questioned, but again defended.

Back to the analyzing Mishnah: The Gemara asks what the Rabbis derive from the verse “and you shall not bear false witness,” to which the Gemara responds that they needed it as a basic warning to Zomemin witnesses. In which case, where does R’ Meir learn the warning to Zomemin witnesses? To which the Gemara answers, from the verse, “All who remain shall hear and fear…” The Rabbi’s, on the other hand, needed that verse for the principle of proclamation.

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Question to Consider: We learned last year about the concept of Kim Leih B’drabah Mineih, which teaches us that if a person does one act that incurs two penalties, you only get the harsher punishment. Why wasn’t this rule brought up as proof for the Rabbi’s view that the Edim Zomemin only get one punishment but not two (pay but not lashes)? Additionally, how could R’ Meir say what he said, that the Edim Zomemin get both penalties, if Kim Leih applies?

B'kiut post for Daf Gimmel of Mesechet Makkot

Summary:

The Gemara asks a question: What is the main point of what Rav Nachman is saying (The point that these witnesses did not do anything at this moment and yet, they are paying) since this is just what Rabbah said?

It therefore answers and says: Let it say, “Similarly, Rav Nachman says” so that it shows that Rav Nachman is just further explaining Rabbah.

            Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that a zomem witness should pay according to his portion.

Question 1: What does “paying according to his portion,” mean? If we say that it means that one pays half and the other pays half, we’ve already learned this in a Mishna that says that the zomem witnesses can divide a monetary punishment but they cannot divide a sentence of lashes!! This makes the previous statement unnecessary!

 Question 1A: And if this would apply in an example where only one of the two witnesses was proven to be false, which could explain Rav’s statement as the one false witness would pay his share, this is also not possible! This isn’t possible because we learned in a Baraita that a zomem witness doesn’t pay his money unless both witnesses are zomem!!

Rava answers: This is when only one witness admits that he was a zomem.

Attack on Rava: Can this actually happen? Since there is a rule that once someone has testified, they cannot go back and change their narrative. (Therefore, the Beit Din can’t accept this testimony of his confession and would then not be able to require this witness to pay the penalty of hazamah)

Explanation of Rava’s answer: Rather, this case that Rava mentions is a case where a witness says in court that their testimony in Beit Din ploni was falsified. (This isn’t a changing of his testimony but is his admitting to liability)

Attack on this explanation: Who would validate this? Certainly not R’ Akiva since he said in a Baraita earlier that one cannot pay based on his own confession! (This is because he considered the penalty for hazamah a fine, which this rule applies to as well).

Explanation of Rava’s answer: Rather, this case is when a witness says the earlier explanation of both witnesses being falsified in Beit Din ploni and THEN adds that they were liable to pay. (This is because he is admitting to owing a collectable debt, not just one fine! The admission of owing a debt is always accepted)

Therefore, Rav teaches that he pays his share of his total hazamah penalty. You might have thought to say that since one cannot obligate his partner through his own confession, that he should also not become obligated to pay his penalty. Therefore, Rav teaches us that this is possible.

            The Mishna states: Witnesses come and testify that a man divorced his wife without paying the ketubah, thereby causing a monetary loss for the husband since he now has to pay. These witnesses are zomemim and now have to pay the husband the value of the ketubah (his monetary loss). However, maybe he wouldn’t have had to pay her the ketubah anyways today or tomorrow if he or she dies? This means that the Beit Din cannot equate the loss to mean the entire ketubah! Rather, they must evaluate how much one would be willing to pay right now on speculation for the rights of her ketubah on the chance that she is widowed or divorced. Yet, if she dies first, the husband would inherit everything and will not have to pay the ketubah. This gamble makes the prices decrease significantly thereby decreasing the penalty that the zomem witnesses have to pay as well.

           

            The Gemara asks: How is the amount of the penalty calculated?

Rav Chisda answers: By the worth of the husband’s placement in the situation since this would be his monetary loss if they weren’t caught.

Rav Natan bar Oshaya also answers: By the worth of the wife’s position.

Rav Papa also answers: By the worth of the wife’s position but only in regards to her primary ketubah.

           

            The Mishna states: If witnesses come and testify that a man owes his fellow man 1000 zuz on the condition that he repays this over the course of one month yet the man says that it was over the course of 10 years, the witnesses are zomem and now their penalty must be calculated since the monetary loss wouldn’t be 1000 zuz due to the fact that the defendant DID admit to owing the money. Rather, it would have to be the difference between paying 1000 zuz over one month or over 10 years.

            The Gemara brings a statement said by Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel that if one lends another money for 10 years, the shmitah year cancels the loan. Even though now we cannot apply to him the statement that prohibits him from pressing the borrower for the money, ultimately this loan will be subject to the statement anyways during shmitah.  

Rav Kahana’s attack: We assess how much a person would be willing to give to own 1000 zuz from the difference between having to repay them within one month and repaying them in 10 years. But if you say, that shmitah cancels the debt even if it’s not due yet, the zomem witnesses should have to pay the whole 1000 zuz to the defendant! So why doesn’t the Mishna say this?

Rava answers: In the Mishna, it is discussing a lending of money on collateral (lending money on the condition that the borrower will leave something with the lender and if he does not pay the money back in a certain time frame, the lender keeps the item) or when one gives in his documents to the court. For we have learned in a Mishna that these two cases do not get its debts cancelled.

There are those who say that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that if one lends another money for 10 years, the shmitah year does not cancel the loan. Even though this loan could ultimately be subject to the statement of not pressing the borrower for the money, nevertheless we cannot apply this statement to him now.

Rav Kahana supports this and says: We have also learned this in a Mishna that we assess how much a person would be willing to give to own 1000 zuz from the difference between having to repay them within one month and repaying them in 10 years. And if you say that shmitah cancels the debt, the zomemim therefore, should have to pay the entire sum of 1000 zuz to the defendant.

Rava attacks: There is no proof since in the Mishna, it is discussing a lending of money on collateral or when one gives in his documents to the court. And we have learned in a Mishna that these are the two cases that do not get its debts cancelled.

            Rav Yehuda also said in the name of Shmuel that if one says to his friend who has requested to borrow money that he will only lend on the condition that shmitah doesn’t cancel my loan, shmitah still cancels it.

We can say that Shmuel believes that this is contradicting the Torah, and whoever does this, their conditions are void.

Question: But it has been said that when a man says to his friend buying an object that he will sell it on the condition that he do not claim fraud against him, doesn’t Rav say the buyer can still claim fraud while Shmuel says the buyer can’t claim fraud?

Answer: But it has been said that Rav Anan said that Shmuel explained it to him personally that whether or not that right is valid depends on the wording of the condition. If he said, “ on the condition that YOU DON’T HAVE A CLAIM of fraud against me”, then the buyer cannot claim fraud. If he said, “on the condition that THERE IS no fraud”, then the buyer can claim fraud if necessary. Here too, if it was said,  “on the condition that YOU DON’T cancel the debt in shmitah” the shmitah doesn’t cancel his debt. Yet, if it was said,  “on the condition that SHMITAH DOESN’T cancel the debt” the shmitah does cancel his debt.

            We have learned in a Baraita that if one lends another money without specifying when he wants it to be repaid, he cannot demand payment before one month afterward. Rabbah bar bar Chana, while studying with Rav said that this only applies for a loan recorded in a document since it would be uncommon for one to burden themselves to write a document for a loan of less than one month but for an oral law, this doesn’t apply.

Attack: Rav said to Rabbah that his uncle said this rule does apply in both circumstances. We also learned this in a Baraita that if one lends another money without specifying when he wants it to be repaid, he cannot demand payment before one month afterward, whether he lends with a document or whether he lends orally.

The explanation of the source of this rule: Since the pasuk that discusses shmitah says, “ the seventh year, the year of shmitah, draws near”, we wonder what could be learned from “the seventh year draws near”. Would I not have known that it is the year of the cancellation of debts? If so, what is the purpose of saying “the year of shmitah”? It is to teach you that there is a similar cancellation to this one, which is the case of not being able to claim money owed before one month if a due date was not specified and Mar has said 30 days within a year may be considered a year (when discussing orlah).

            Rav Yehuda said in Rav’s name that if one makes a neck opening on Shabbat, he is liable to a chatat offering.

Rav Kahana’s attack: How does this differ from a barrel lid?

Response: This is bonded but the barrel and lid is not bonded.

            Rav Yehuda also said in Rav’s name that if 3 lugin of drawn water (that fell into a kortov of wine and has the color of wine) fell into a mikvah, it does not invalidate it.

Rav Kahana’s attack: How does this differ from colored water? Since in a Mishna R’ Yossi says that colored water invalidates a mikvah with 3 lugin.

Response: There, the mixture is referred to as colored water but here; the mixture is referred to as diluted wine.

Question to consider:  The Gemara discusses how one would be able to claim someone is overcharging them or how one would be able to make sure a debt isn’t cancelled by the shmitah year. Yet, it also says in the Torah that shmitah is a year of rest and it continues on to set the guidelines on how one should be handling financial transactions during that year. 

How is this allowed that two people can construct a valid business deal that violates Hashem’s will/commandment about debts in the shmitah year? Hashem explicitly explained to us what He wanted and now the rabbis in the Gemara are making a system to get around it! In other areas of Halacha, man cannot just make a rule that if two people agree to do a prohibited act that it is all of a sudden okay. Why is this different in business? The Torah is telling us that you can’t overcharge someone and now we are saying you can, if you say “this and this” and the Torah is also telling us to cancel debts in the shmitah but we’re saying you don’t have to if you say it in a certain way! Aren’t we building an alternate universe that’s veering off of Halacha?