Summary:
The Gemara asks a question: What is the main point of what Rav
Nachman is saying (The point that these witnesses did not do anything at this
moment and yet, they are paying) since this is just what Rabbah said?
It therefore answers
and says: Let it say, “Similarly, Rav Nachman says” so that it shows that
Rav Nachman is just further explaining Rabbah.
Rav Yehuda
says in the name of Rav that a zomem
witness should pay according to his portion.
Question 1: What
does “paying according to his portion,” mean? If we say that it means that one
pays half and the other pays half, we’ve already learned this in a Mishna that says that the zomem witnesses can divide a monetary
punishment but they cannot divide a sentence of lashes!! This makes the
previous statement unnecessary!
Question 1A: And if this would apply in an example where only one
of the two witnesses was proven to be false, which could explain Rav’s
statement as the one false witness would pay his share, this is also not
possible! This isn’t possible because we learned in a Baraita that a zomem
witness doesn’t pay his money unless both witnesses are zomem!!
Rava answers: This
is when only one witness admits that he was a zomem.
Attack on Rava:
Can this actually happen? Since there is a rule that once someone has testified,
they cannot go back and change their narrative. (Therefore, the Beit Din can’t
accept this testimony of his confession and would then not be able to require
this witness to pay the penalty of hazamah)
Explanation of Rava’s
answer: Rather, this case that Rava mentions is a case where a witness says
in court that their testimony in Beit Din ploni
was falsified. (This isn’t a changing of his testimony but is his admitting to
liability)
Attack on this
explanation: Who would validate this? Certainly not R’ Akiva since he said
in a Baraita earlier that one cannot
pay based on his own confession! (This is because he considered the penalty for
hazamah a fine, which this rule
applies to as well).
Explanation of Rava’s
answer: Rather, this case is when a witness says the earlier explanation of
both witnesses being falsified in Beit Din ploni
and THEN adds that they were liable to pay. (This is because he is admitting to
owing a collectable debt, not just one fine! The admission of owing a debt is
always accepted)
Therefore, Rav teaches that he pays his share of his total hazamah penalty. You might have thought
to say that since one cannot obligate his partner through his own confession,
that he should also not become obligated to pay his penalty. Therefore, Rav
teaches us that this is possible.
The Mishna states: Witnesses come and testify
that a man divorced his wife without paying the ketubah, thereby causing a monetary loss for the husband since he
now has to pay. These witnesses are zomemim
and now have to pay the husband the value of the ketubah (his monetary loss). However, maybe he wouldn’t have had to
pay her the ketubah anyways today or
tomorrow if he or she dies? This means that the Beit Din cannot equate the loss
to mean the entire ketubah! Rather,
they must evaluate how much one would be willing to pay right now on
speculation for the rights of her ketubah
on the chance that she is widowed or divorced. Yet, if she dies first, the
husband would inherit everything and will not have to pay the ketubah. This gamble makes the prices
decrease significantly thereby decreasing the penalty that the zomem witnesses have to pay as well.
The Gemara asks: How is the
amount of the penalty calculated?
Rav Chisda answers:
By the worth of the husband’s placement in the situation since this would be
his monetary loss if they weren’t caught.
Rav Natan bar Oshaya
also answers: By the worth of the wife’s position.
Rav Papa also
answers: By the worth of the wife’s position but only in regards to her
primary ketubah.
The Mishna states: If witnesses come
and testify that a man owes his fellow man 1000 zuz on the condition that he repays this over the course of one
month yet the man says that it was over the course of 10 years, the witnesses
are zomem and now their penalty must
be calculated since the monetary loss wouldn’t be 1000 zuz due to the fact that the defendant DID admit to owing the
money. Rather, it would have to be the difference between paying 1000 zuz over one month or over 10 years.
The Gemara brings a statement said by Rav
Yehuda in the name of Shmuel that if one lends another money for 10 years, the shmitah year cancels the loan. Even
though now we cannot apply to him the statement that prohibits him from pressing
the borrower for the money, ultimately this loan will be subject to the
statement anyways during shmitah.
Rav Kahana’s attack:
We assess how much a person would be willing to give to own 1000 zuz from the difference between having
to repay them within one month and repaying them in 10 years. But if you say,
that shmitah cancels the debt even if
it’s not due yet, the zomem witnesses
should have to pay the whole 1000 zuz
to the defendant! So why doesn’t the Mishna
say this?
Rava answers: In
the Mishna, it is discussing a
lending of money on collateral (lending money on the condition that the
borrower will leave something with the lender and if he does not pay the money
back in a certain time frame, the lender keeps the item) or when one gives in
his documents to the court. For we have learned in a Mishna that these two cases do not get its debts cancelled.
There are those who say that Rav
Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that if one lends another money for 10 years,
the shmitah year does not cancel the
loan. Even though this loan could ultimately be subject to the statement of not
pressing the borrower for the money, nevertheless we cannot apply this
statement to him now.
Rav Kahana supports
this and says: We have also learned this in a Mishna that we assess how much a person would be willing to give to
own 1000 zuz from the difference
between having to repay them within one month and repaying them in 10 years.
And if you say that shmitah cancels
the debt, the zomemim therefore,
should have to pay the entire sum of 1000 zuz
to the defendant.
Rava attacks:
There is no proof since in the Mishna,
it is discussing a lending of money on collateral or when one gives in his
documents to the court. And we have learned in a Mishna that these are the two cases that do not get its debts
cancelled.
Rav Yehuda
also said in the name of Shmuel that if one says to his friend who has
requested to borrow money that he will only lend on the condition that shmitah doesn’t cancel my loan, shmitah still cancels it.
We can say that Shmuel believes that this is contradicting
the Torah, and whoever does this,
their conditions are void.
Question: But it
has been said that when a man says to his friend buying an object that he will
sell it on the condition that he do not claim fraud against him, doesn’t Rav
say the buyer can still claim fraud while Shmuel says the buyer can’t claim
fraud?
Answer: But it
has been said that Rav Anan said that Shmuel explained it to him personally
that whether or not that right is valid depends on the wording of the
condition. If he said, “ on the condition that YOU DON’T HAVE A CLAIM of fraud
against me”, then the buyer cannot claim fraud. If he said, “on the condition
that THERE IS no fraud”, then the buyer can claim fraud if necessary. Here too,
if it was said, “on the condition that
YOU DON’T cancel the debt in shmitah”
the shmitah doesn’t cancel his debt.
Yet, if it was said, “on the condition
that SHMITAH DOESN’T cancel the debt”
the shmitah does cancel his debt.
We have
learned in a Baraita that if one
lends another money without specifying when he wants it to be repaid, he cannot
demand payment before one month afterward. Rabbah bar bar Chana, while studying
with Rav said that this only applies for a loan recorded in a document since it
would be uncommon for one to burden themselves to write a document for a loan
of less than one month but for an oral law, this doesn’t apply.
Attack: Rav said
to Rabbah that his uncle said this rule does apply in both circumstances. We
also learned this in a Baraita that
if one lends another money without specifying when he wants it to be repaid, he
cannot demand payment before one month afterward, whether he lends with a
document or whether he lends orally.
The explanation of
the source of this rule: Since the pasuk
that discusses shmitah says, “ the
seventh year, the year of shmitah,
draws near”, we wonder what could be learned from “the seventh year draws
near”. Would I not have known that it is the year of the cancellation of debts?
If so, what is the purpose of saying “the year of shmitah”? It is to teach you that there is a similar cancellation
to this one, which is the case of not being able to claim money owed before one
month if a due date was not specified and Mar
has said 30 days within a year may be considered a year (when discussing orlah).
Rav Yehuda
said in Rav’s name that if one makes a neck opening on Shabbat, he is liable to a chatat
offering.
Rav Kahana’s attack:
How does this differ from a barrel lid?
Response: This is
bonded but the barrel and lid is not bonded.
Rav Yehuda
also said in Rav’s name that if 3 lugin
of drawn water (that fell into a kortov
of wine and has the color of wine) fell into a mikvah, it does not invalidate it.
Rav Kahana’s attack: How
does this differ from colored water? Since in a Mishna R’ Yossi says that colored water invalidates a mikvah with 3 lugin.
Response: There,
the mixture is referred to as colored water but here; the mixture is referred
to as diluted wine.
Question to consider: The Gemara discusses how one would be able
to claim someone is overcharging them or how one would be able to make sure a
debt isn’t cancelled by the shmitah
year. Yet, it also says in the Torah
that shmitah is a year of rest and it
continues on to set the guidelines on how one should be handling financial
transactions during that year.
How is this allowed that two people
can construct a valid business deal that violates Hashem’s will/commandment about debts in the shmitah year? Hashem
explicitly explained to us what He wanted and now the rabbis in the Gemara are making
a system to get around it! In other areas of Halacha, man cannot just make a rule that if two people agree to do
a prohibited act that it is all of a sudden okay. Why is this different in
business? The Torah is telling us that
you can’t overcharge someone and now we are saying you can, if you say “this
and this” and the Torah is also telling
us to cancel debts in the shmitah but
we’re saying you don’t have to if you say it in a certain way! Aren’t we building
an alternate universe that’s veering off of Halacha?
Ellie, I think that you pose a very good question. I feel that as the world changes, sometimes Halachot have to change slightly as well. In an ideal world, which is described in the Torah, nobody should be able to overcharge in business or be exempt from canceling debts in the Shmita year. But in the times of the Gemara and in the modern world as well, these ideas simply are not realistic. For example, it might be considered "overcharging" for Target to buy an item for $10 from the manufacturer and then sell it in the store for $15. But if Target did not "overcharge", they would not make a worthwhile profit and their business would be futile. Additionally, if debts were all actually cancelled in the Shmita year, nobody would lend money out of fear that they would not get it back. So coming back to the question, I don't think that the Gemara is changing the Halachot of the Torah, rather, it is adapting them to better suit the society in which they live.
ReplyDeleteI think that the halacha was allowed to be changed by the Rabbis in this case that overcharging someone or canceling debts are allowed and not veering off halacha. As well as the times changing around us, the Rabbis go through a complex process to alter a halacha and only do it for extenuating circumstances, so they make sure that what they are doing is necessary and in the spirit of the Torah. The rabbis probably saw that it was difficult for people to make a profit or that people would lose money by lending to another person when they might forget or not be able to pay the debt since it would be cancelled during shmitah. The rabbis might have changed these laws so it would make people not as worried about money so they could truly rest during the shmitah year which is in the spirit of the torah.
ReplyDeleteI'm going to be very honest-- I don't have an answer to your question, Ellie, because it's something that really bothers me. Just to elaborate a little, there are two levels here on which I take issue. Firstly, there are plenty of mitzvot that people are not careful about or just outright violate regularly, and not just some people, but majorities of communities sometimes. Should we start making ways to get around these mitzvot as well, just because people find them "inconvenient to keep" or "outdated"? Secondly, if we continue to find these loopholes, it will set a precedent, showing the masses that when we don't agree with or "feel like" keeping a mitzvah, don't worry! We can just find a way to get around it! That seems like a dangerous path to set ourselves on, a path to, as you said (I like your phrasing) "alternate universe that’s veering off of Halachah."
ReplyDeleteAt the end of the day, the best answer I can come up with is that we have to trust the Gedolim (but if that answer feels unsatisfactory to you, it's because it isn't quite satisfactory to me, either).
I agree with Shana and with Yehudit. Yes, it is important to follow halacha because it is the way HaShem intended things to be, but at the same time, the Rabbis are looking out for the people because they know that the halacha might not be the most realistic for human nature. I think that a good reasoning for "getting around" halacha is to get the end result out of the mitzvah. I know this can be a dangerous way of thinking, but instead of people worrying about money, they can really celebrate the shmitah year, which is the end goal of the mitzvah. This idea, of means to an end, should not be used in all halachic situations, but the Rabbis must have thought that this is a very important thing to do so that the shmittah year can be followed in the way that HaShem wanted, instead of worrying about money.
ReplyDeleteI basically agree with everything that has already been said. I struggle with understanding how there can be a work around for allowing debts to not be canceled out by shmitta, which is explicitly stated in the Torah, but then with other issues, like agunot, no work around has been created. However, one way I look at this it is that halacha needs to be applied to everything in our life and sometimes, the ideal world that the Torah tries to create is not the world that we live in. Hashem gave the rabbis the ability to make laws that will help the people and this is one thing that they have done with it. As to whether we are creating an alternate universe, there are other instances, such as “eyin tachat eyin”, where something that is stated in the Torah is not actually what we follow. While it can be frustrating when the Torah cannot be followed explicitly, it is comforting that there are ways worked into the religion to make life a little easier.
ReplyDeleteFirst, I don't thing that anyone can just change\tweak halacha, but the Rabbi's in the Gemara, are on a different level than us and we have to have "Emunat Chachamim" (as Chana pointed out). The Rabbi's had to make these loopholes, seemingly because if they didn't, people would not lend money to others (near Shemitta year), and lending money is a mitvah and an important factor in a successful and moral society. In essence, I think the Rabbi's are trying to protect the mitzvot, and keep a functioning society. I don't know how far the Rabbi's can go to protect certain mitzvot, when it means forfeiting a mitzvat lo taaseh, but i think (but not sure) that there are different "levels" of mitzvot- lo taaseh v. aseh (I don't really know for sure, but its just a thought- I would have to do more research on this matter)
ReplyDeleteI was happy to see your question Ellie, because the topic you wrote about was the one that stuck out in my mind as well while learning the daf. After reading all the previous comments I saw a different side of the issue than i was anticipating. Originally, I saw the point in the gemara as more of a lesson teaching us how to edit the statement of "shmita will not exist" to "shmita will not exist for me this time", or from "ohna'ah doesn't exist" to "ohna'ah doesn't apply to me here", so as to avoid veering on a heretical path, and nearing the abrogation of halacha. It made sense to me while learning the gemara that making the issue personal and specific, we could avoid destructing the halacha. However, now I am slightly dumbfounded, trying to figure out how, practically, anyone could actually override the issur on overpricing or on overriding the dissolution of loans over shmita. It is a great question, as others said, and of course we must trust the Rabbis. While the "it may not be practical halacha today" answer is not usually satisfying, I do see the moral and halachic issues presented by the gemara's conclusion and I would like to look into the halacha l'maaseh of the gemara to find out what the practical applications are today.
ReplyDeleteWhen approaching Halacha, I once heard an interesting machloket as to what approach to take when making chumrot or kulot. One approach is that HaShem gave us halachot to follow, and we should try to understand the spirit of the law as well as the specific details of the halacha. For example, we understand that Shabbos is a day of rest and a time to get closer with HaShem. Therefore, we set the tone of the day by spending time with family, davening, learning, etc. However, there is a whole category of activities that we refrain from doing on shabbos, not because they fall under one of the 39 melachot, but instead because they are simply "not shabbosdic" and take away from the atmosphere of the Day of Rest. When we understand the spirit of the law, we can take chumrot upon ourselves to add to the spirit of the law.
ReplyDeleteThe second approach to understanding halacha is that HaShem made the laws in such a way that the purpose that they serve is fulfilled through just the letter of the law. Whatever "loopholes" we find in halacha, (such as the one discussed in our Gemara about not cancelling debts based on the specific language that we use) do not in any way detract from the purpose that the halacha serves. HaShem knew what loopholes would ultimately be found in the halachot, and He was ok with that-- the halachot still serve their purpose. I think that could be the answer to the issue that Leora brought up-- the Rabbis have been able to find ways that debts can remain intact through the shmita year, because whatever purpose shmita is supposed to fulfill will still be fulfilled even with this "loophole." On the other hand, loopholes may not have been found in the case of agunot because maybe the halacha was constructed in such a way that does not allow for these loopholes, because HaShem understood that any loophole would take away from the purpose of this mitzvah.
So if you take the first approach, that we are supposed to contribute to the spirit of the law, then this Gemara is very troubling and seems to detract from the shmita atmosphere of equality-- where no one is supposed to work the land, and no one is in debt any longer, because we now have a way to keep debts. But, if you take the second approach, then these "loopholes" do not at all take away from the spirit and purpose of shmita.
Ellie, I think that your question is a very poignant one. I think that it begs the very interesting and complicated question of how Halacha is supposed to evolve. This case appears to be a blatant case of going against Hashem's original law, which is very alarming. Does this case open the opportunity for us to change Halacha as time goes on in order to best fit our desires, or do we say that Halacha was created by God and explained by those who are intellectually superior to us, and we thus must adhere to them strictly and not impose changes, or is there some sort of middle ground. I think that this case is a demonstration that Halacha can undergo an evolutionary process, which is in some sense comforting, because it will allow Halacha to remain with those who wouldn't otherwise follow it, but is it even Halacha anymore if we disregard God's word?
ReplyDeleteI think this is a very interesting question, and I'm glad you asked it, because I really like seeing everyone's different perspectives on it. I do agree that it seems as though we are just getting around a Halacha that HaShem has made for us, and I believe that it is a very dangerous path, because as you mentioned it can very easily lead to a path veering off Halacha. However, I also realize that we must all recognize the greatness of the Rabbis in the Gemara who made this loophole, and I trust that they made it with only the best intentions in mind. Clearly they had valid reasons for allowing the debts to not be cancelled during the shmita year for reasons such as not enough people giving out loans for fear that the money would never be returned to them, and in the end it was hurting the people who needed these loans. I do not think that Halachot should hurt people and be viewed negatively, and people may have been beginning to view the Halacha in this way, and so the Rabbis in the Gemara did what they could to help the situation. I think it is important though to recognize that we are not on the same level as the Rabbis in the Gemara, and that we cannot choose to make a loophole in just any Halacha. I also remember discussing this with Rabbi Besser in class in 9th grade and he said that this is not to be viewed as a good thing, or something that we should be proud of being able to do, but rather it should be viewed as a sad reality. We must recognize that it is unfortunate that these loopholes had to be made.
ReplyDeleteI think that this question is a very important one to address; it does seem like we are finding ways around Halachot that are in place during the year of Shemittah. However, if you read into the Pasuk that teaches us about canceling debts in the Shemittah year, we are just being very peculiar about the Halacha. The pesukim that teach us about this are in Devarim, 15:1-6. It is written, "Every creditor shall release that which he hath lent unto his neighbor; he shall not exact it of his neighbor and his brother..." The pesukim specify that the creditor must release the debt and not "exact it" of the people that owe it to him. In the Gemara, the words that the creditor must use when agreeing to lend something are: "On the condition that you not cancel (your debt to) me in the Shemittah year". Here, it is clear that the creditor must specify that the borrower not cancel. No matter what, the creditor must cancel the debt--he must listen to Hashem and release all the debts that people owe him. But there is still a way which the creditor can be paid his debt--if the borrower doesn't cancel and still pays the debt. There is no Halacha about the borrower not paying back the debt--he still can pay it, and therefore the debt would be paid, without overriding Halacha. The reason that the Gemara specifies the language to use is purposely not to have us override Halacha. (There is a third way with which the creditor could make a deal, which is mentioned in the Gemara, but it does not work because of the reason the Gemara provides.)
ReplyDeleteYes, the Gemara may seem to be changing the Torah's words, but we also have to keep in mind the financial situation the Jews were in during the Shmita year. Yes, the Jews were promised by G-d in the Torah that they will be "blessed" by G-d, but what if they were bad that year? Doesn't it say in Shemah that if the Jews sin they won't get rain? I believe that it is definitely possible that the Rabbis are being pragmatic and trying to earn the Jews a little extra cash. One can argue that this is disrespecting the Torah, but it can also be that the Rabbis are trying to save Judaism. Amending the rules is extremely better than Jews in hardship during the Shmitah year completely deviating from Halacha and working the land instead.
ReplyDeleteI learned about these rules to get around שמיטה a while back (I don't remember when or if it was even in Maayanot), and these questions came up. The answer I learned is that even though it was not G-d's will for man to try to circumvent the laws of שמיטה, Jews were doing it anyway. Before the רבים added these "loopholes" to the שמיטה laws, Jews were becoming more and more reluctant to lend out money around the שמיטה year because they knew they wouldn't get repaid. As a result, the poor suffered. As it says in the תורה that you are NOT supposed to stop lending to try to circumvent the שמיטה year, עם ישראל found themselves violating the laws of שמיטה continually. Therefore, the רבים saw it necessary to make laws in which there was a way to get around the monetary exemptions the שמיטה year brings so that עם ישראל would not continuously violate הלכות שמיטה and the poor would not suffer as a result. Furthermore, G-d gave the רבים the authority to make Halachic loopholes such as this because He KNEW that some things would need to be fluid as time moved forward. Since it was getting harder and harder for בני ישראל to keep הלכות שמיטה as they were, the רבים felt it was imperative that something be added to make it easier to abide by הלכות שמיטה. And, in the end, everyone was happy- lenders got their money back, borrowers got the money they needed, and בני ישראל were no longer continuously violating שמיטה (which probably made the רבים happier).
ReplyDelete*בני ישראל was no longer... sorry. It was bothering me.
ReplyDeleteThe idea of canceling debts instills an important ethical value. When someone is unable to pay back a debt, it is a burden upon him or her. The knowledge that the debt is cancelled if one is unable to pay it back is a relief. It also makes the loan an act of tzidakah. Knowing that the loan isn't guaranteed to be paid back makes loaning a selfless act. Although there had to be a loophole or people wouldn't lend and wouldn't be paid back, the idea still remains. Unfortunate financial situations prevent the idea from being put into practice but ultimately the Jewish nation maintains the value. The fact that the concept even exists shows that it is important to take into account the financial burdens of others and be empathetic.
ReplyDeleteThe idea of canceling debts instills an important ethical value. When someone is unable to pay back a debt, it is a burden upon him or her. The knowledge that the debt is cancelled if one is unable to pay it back is a relief. It also makes the loan an act of tzidakah. Knowing that the loan isn't guaranteed to be paid back makes loaning a selfless act. Although there had to be a loophole or people wouldn't lend and wouldn't be paid back, the idea still remains. Unfortunate financial situations prevent the idea from being put into practice but ultimately the Jewish nation maintains the value. The fact that the concept even exists shows that it is important to take into account the financial burdens of others and be empathetic.
ReplyDelete