Bekiut Masechet Makkot, Daf Zayin
Chana
Thank you to Artscroll for the assistance.

SUMMARY

(Gemara continued from discussion on previous daf)
Case: Ila'a and Tuvyah were related to a cosigner of a loan, and they witnessed the loan being signed.
R' Papa: It doesn't matter-- they can still testify-- because they were only relatives of the cosigner, not the actual lender or borrower.
R' Huna b' R' Yehoshua: However, if the borrower doesn't have the money to pay back the loan (shoutout to AP English: Merchant of Venice!!), doesn't the cosigner have to pay it? Therefore, s/he is really involved in the case, and Ila'a and Tuvyah should not be able to be witnesses.

Mishnah
1) If someone receives their verdict from Beit Din, runs away before their execution, and then returns to that Beit Din, the Beit Din does not have to try again to save him/her.
2) If two witnesses come and testify that someone was found guilty in another Beit Din, and they cite the name of the Beit Din and the witnesses of the case, then the guilty person is executed.
3) A Sanhedrin's rulings hold up, both in Israel and in Chutz La'aretz.
4) A Sanhedrin that executes once in seven years is called destructive.
    R' Eliezer b' Azaryah: Once in seventy years. (See below for discussion of this translation)
    R' Tarfon and R' Akiva: If we were on Sanhedrin when they were still performing executions, we would never have executed anyone.
    R' Shimon b' Gamliel (to R' Tarfon and R' Akiva): Then there would have been a ton of murders in Israel (because there would be no deterrent).

Gemara
Question: The first rule in the Mishnah only says that we don't reconsider a sentence and try to save the defendant when they reappear before the same Beit Din. However, the end of the Mishnah (rule 2) seems to say that we don't retry the defendant in another Beit Din either. So why didn't it say that in the first rule?
Answer: Abaye: It's not a difficulty, because the first rule is talking about a Beit Din in Israel, whereas the second one is talking about a Beit Din in Chu"L. This is explained in the following Braita:
Braita: R' Yehuda b' Dostai quotes R' Shimon b' Shatach: When the defendant runs away from a Beit Din in Israel to one in Chu"L, s/he is not retried, but when the defendant runs away from a Beit Din in Chu"L to one in Israel, s/he is retried, because maybe the zechut of Israel will help the judges find a loophole and save the defendant.

Question: How do we know that the rulings of a Sanhedrin hold up, both in Israel and Chu"L?
Source: "These will be the laws of judgement for you for generations" (paraphrased Artscroll translation). The pasuk continues to say "in all the places you live," so the rulings of Sanhedrin must apply, no matter where.
Question: If that's the source, then why does it say somewhere else, "in all your gates"?
Answer: To teach that in Israel there must be courts in every city in every province, whereas in Chu"L, they are only needed in every province.

Question: When R' Eliezer b' Azaryah said "Once in seventy years," was he fixing the previous statement ("no, it's once in seventy, not once in seven years"), or saying that once in seventy was appropriate?
Answer: Teku (we don't know).

Question: How would R' Tarfon and R' Akiva have prevented all executions?
Answer: R' Yochanan and R' Elazar: They would ask whether the witness had seen whether the person was a treifah (someone who will die soon anyway and therefore there is no death penalty for their killer). R' Ashi: Then, if the witnesses said that they saw that the person was not a treifah, they would ask if the witness could possibly know if there was a hole in an internal organ (which they could not).
Question: How would they have prevented executions in a case of gilui arayot?
Answer: Abaye and Rava: They would ask the witnesses if they had witnessed the actual penetration, (which they probably hadn't).
Question: But then how could anyone ever be executed for adultery?
Answer: As Shmuel did: When the witnesses saw the suspected couple behaving in a way that lends itself to be suspected of adultery.

HADRAN ALACH KEITZAD HA'EDIM

Mishnah
Statement: People who kill accidentally are exiled to Arei Miklat.
Examples of people who are exiled:
1) If someone was pushing a roller to plaster a roof and it fell and killed someone
2) If someone was lowering a barrel off a roof and it fell and killed someone
3) If he was coming down a ladder and fell on someone and killed them
Examples of people who are not exiled:
1) If someone was pulling a roller to plaster a roof and it fell and killed someone
2) If someone was raising a barrel onto a roof and it fell and killed someone
3) If he was coming up a ladder and fell on someone and killed them
General Rule: If the motion that resulted in the person's death was a downward one, then the perpetrator is exiled. If the motion that resulted in the person's death was an upward one, then the perpetrator is not exiled.

Gemara
Question: How do we know (about the downward vs upward motion rule)?
Source: Shmuel: The pasuk says "He caused it to fall on him, and he died"-- it must be falling, and therefore downward.

Braita: The word "bishgagah" ("by accident") is to exclude someone who kills b'meizid (on purpose). The word "bivli da'at" ("without knowledge") is to exclude someone who kills b'mitkavein (with intention).
Challenge: It is obvious that someone who kills b'meizid is not exiled, because s/he is deserving of the death penalty!
Answer: Rava: Rather, it excludes someone who thinks that murder is permitted.
Challenge: Abaye: But someone who thinks that murder is permitted is an ones, and not a meizid!
Answer: Rava: No, I hold that someone who thinks it's allowed is comparable to someone who killed on purpose.
Challenge: It is obvious that someone who kills b'mitkavein is not exiled, because s/he is deserving of the death penalty!
Answer: Rabbah: It excludes someone who was trying to kill an animal but instead accidentally killed a man, someone who was trying to kill a Kuti but instead accidentally killed a Jew, and someone who was trying to kill a nefel but instead accidentally killed a viable baby.

Braita: In the pasuk, "If suddenly" excludes if one accidentally kills someone coming around the corner; "without malice" excludes someone who kills an enemy, regardless of if it was an accident; "he pushed him" means that s/he accidentally pushed him/her with his/her body; "or he threw something at him" includes someone who killed with a downward motion that is needed for an upward motion; "without ambush" excludes someone who aimed one way but their projectile went in the other direction and killed someone. Another source that says "And one who did not ambush" excludes someone who intended to throw a projectile two amot but accidentally threw it four and killed someone. "And if one comes with his friend in the forest" teaches that just like a forest is a place where both the accidental killer and the victim have the right to be, so too, any area where both the accidental killer and the victim have the right to be, is a place where the killing can fall into the category of requiring exile.

Question: R' Abahu asked R' Yochanan: If someone is going up a ladder and the rung fell out from under his/her foot, what is it considered? Is it upward, because the person is going up, or downward, because the foot was pressing the rung down?
Answer: R' Yochanan: That is a case where there is a downward motion required for an upward one.
Challenge: R' Abahu: But why does the Mishnah say twice that a downward motion is chayav a person to be exiled, and not an upward motion? Isn't it to teach that this case is not one that results in exile?
Answer: R' Yochanan: But according to your reasoning, why does the Mishnah need to say it the first time? Rather, it must be to add the case of the butcher: (Braita) Case: if a butcher is chopping meat and accidentally kills someone.
-One Braita: If s/he killed them while s/he was swinging his/her arm and cleaver forward, s/he is chayav exile, but not if s/he was swinging it backward.
-Another Braita: If s/he killed them while s/he was swinging his/her arm and cleaver backward, s/he is chayav exile, but not if s/he was swinging it forward.
-Another Braita: Regardless of whether it was forward or backward, s/he is chayav.
-Another Braita: Regardless of whether it was forward or backward, s/he is not chayav.
Resolution: There is no difficulty among the Braitot. The first is talking about when the forward motion is downward and the backward motion is upward, the second is talking about when the backward motion is downward and the forward motion is upward, the third is when both forward and backward are downward, and the fourth is when both forward and backward are upward.

Proposal: Let's say that R' Abahu's case of the ladder is like the following: If someone is going up a ladder and the rung falls and kills someone, one Braita says s/he is chayav exile, and the other says s/he is not.
Question: Isn't the following what they disagree about?
Suggestion: One says it's upward, and one says it's downward.
Rejection: No, because everyone says it's upward...
Resolution: ...but there is no difficulty between the two Braitot. The first is when the victim was damaged but not killed (so there is no exile), and the second is when the victim was killed.
Another suggestion: There is no difficulty, because the first is talking about a rotting, worm-eaten rung (so it was downwardly sagging), whereas the second is not.
Another suggestion: There is not difficulty-- they were both worm-eaten and rotting, but the first Braita refers to a rung that was not securely attached, whereas the second one was.

Mishnah
Case 1: If the blade falls off the handle of an axe and kills someone, Rebbi says s/he is not chayav exile, whereas the Chachamim say s/he is.
Case 2: If someone was chopping wood and a woodchip flew off and killed someone, Rebbi says s/he is chayav exile, whereas the Chachamim say s/he is.

Gemara
Braita: Rebbi said to the Chachamim: Doesn't the pasuk not refer to the first case, and instead to a case without the axe (the second)? Also, it says "eitz" in both-- therefore, it must refer to the wood being chopped.
Clarification: R' Chiya b' Ashi quotes Rav: Rebbi and the Chachamim quote the same pasuk, but they learn different things: Rebbi bases his understanding on the way that the word is written ("v'nisheil"), whereas the Chachamim base their understanding on the way it is pronounced ("v'nashal").
Question: Does Rebbi really read it this way?

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DISCUSSION QUESTION(s)

I was really late in posting, so as an apology, I'll give you a choice of questions. Feel free to pick the one you want to answer (or more, if you so desire) of the three:

1) What do you think the purpose is of exile/Arei Miklat? Is it to save the person from a goel hadam? Is it a punishment, or is it a deterrent? Extra points if you can back yourself up.
Regarding the treifah logic:
2) Don't we usually follow the majority? Most people are not walking around with holes in their internal organs, so how could we base such a gravely large ruling on a minority?
3) Is the fact that there is no death penalty for someone who kills a treifah positive or negative? (Just to clarify, it's still forbidden, just there is no death penalty.) On the one hand, it may seem callous, because they are still people, but on the other hand, could it be seen as an allowance to put a person out of his/her misery?